The Financialization of Energy Price Trends: Review and Update - 17 Nov 11

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Introduction

By the end of 1999 it had become obvious that something new was happening in energy prices. By year 2000 WTI prices had spent almost an entire year moving in tandem with trends in the S&P 500 Index. There were always occasional period of correlation on a monthly closing basis. But this was a week by week tracking. And as the years unfolded from 2000 this week by week relationship spread to RBOB, and 20il, and Brent, and even to the shape of forward curves. And over the years the relationship between price trends in the S&P 500 Index and price trends in energy evolved from a week by week correlation, to a day by day link, then to hour by hour, and now almost minute by minute. Economic expectations, as embodied by price trends in broad based stock indices like the SPX, now exert absolute dictatorial power over energy prices. Of course the other dictator are price trends in the US Dollar. In this report we explore how this came to be, and what it portends for the future of energy prices.

A Culture of Speculation

There may be no field where the law of unintended consequences rules so thoroughly as the field of economics. There should be no surprise here. Economists are renowned for sticking blindly to failed theories and broken models. The theories and models of traditional economics are failed and broken precisely because they do not produced the desired effects. One of the most egregious examples is the area of interest rate policy.

In traditional economic theory lower interest rates are supposed to stimulate economic activity through increased lending, borrowing, spending. And this is generally the case during a bull market. However this has been shown to not be the case during the deleveraging that follows the collapse of an easy-credit driven speculative bubble. When interest rates are driven low enough during an economic contraction the end result is increased financial speculation, not an economic stimulation.

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The Federal Reserve of Unintended Consequences

Under Alan Greenspan the sole focus of the Fed became perpetuating the bull market in stocks. As the speculative bubble in equities began to inflate more and more rate cuts were required to ensure that the bubble continued to inflate. Despite his one protestation of irrational exhuberance Greenspan's actions revealed another motive altogether. During his reign as Fed chief Greenspan cut the Fed Fund rate from 9.625 % in 1989 to 1.00% in June of 2003. Then Bernanke came on board and lowered the Fed Fund rate from 5.25% in 2006 to the current 0.00 to .25 % range.


Under Bernanke the stated goal of a zero Fed Fund rate was to stimulate the economy through increased borrowing, lending, and spending. However the largest credit bubble in the history of the world burst from 2007. The foundation of our economy, the consumer, faced an immediate an on-going need to reduce the debt load in order to avoid bankruptcy. In fact consumer sentiment has been declining along with the Fed Fund Rate. So were did all this new Fed credit go to if consumers were not taking it on? The pages 3 to 5 charts give quite a dramatic answer.

When the Fed drove interest rates to zero to spur the economy the unintended consequence was a massive flow of funds out of bonds and into speculative trading. As treasuries were no longer yielding an income, speculative trading was going to have to make up the shortfall. The commodity sector became a favorite destination of this new wave of speculation, and as I just noted, the charts tell the story.


Energy Prices as Economic Expectations


In a world where the Federal Reserve thinks that zero interest rates are needed to prevent another financial collapse one can only conclude that the Fed sees a very high risk of deflation. It has been our contention all along that the risk is deflation, not inflation. Our working definition of deflation is still the same - too much debt and not enough revenue to support the debt. That is clearly the problem for cities, states, and countries everywhere. It is also the problem for the average American family. And it is clearly the engine driving the continuing down trend in real estate values. What happens during deflation? As fears rise everyone is compelled to sell assets to remain solvent. So prices for everything fall. Real estate loses value, and commodity prices drop along with stock market values. During inflation the opposite occurs. Too much money and high consumer confidence drive the prices of good and services higher. Deflation is falling prices and an economic contraction. Inflation is rising prices and an economic boom.

So in today's global market, whenever a whiff of hope for reflation and economic recovery waft through the market, stock market values and commodity prices rise as one. Whenever fears of deflation and a further economic contraction spread through the market, equity prices and energy prices fall as one. As we have summarized before, one big market, one big mess. If we get inflation then there is no way energy prices can fall. And if we get deflation then there is no way energy prices can rise. So energy prices have become 'financialized.'




3 month U.S. Treasury Yield & Copper (London Metal Exchange)


























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










Gold - SPX - 17 Nov 11 United-ICAP










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